I bought a paperback copy of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the University of Manitoba Bookstore in the basement of the Student Union building, during the 1971-72 or 1972-73 term. It was not a required text. The book was embraced by sociologists, economists and political scientist seeking validation of claims by teachers of those areas of study as “science”:
The changes that occur in politics, society and business are often expressed in Kuhnian terms, however poor their parallel with the practice of science may seem to scientists and historians of science. The terms “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” have become such notorious clichés and buzzwords that they are sometimes viewed as effectively devoid of content.
Wikipedia entry: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
An article in the magazine The New Republic discussed the the meaning and use of the terms paradigm and paradigm shift in since the early ’70s:
For the culture at large, Structure’s greatest contribution has been linguistic—the notion of “paradigm change” as a synonym for “thinking outside the box.” But read in 2024, in light of the current history wars, the real revolution at the heart of Structure was a paradigm shift in scientific narrative. Who gets to tell the story of a field? And how truthful should they be in their telling?
Audra Wolfe. “What was the Paradigm Shift“, The New Republic, May 22, 2024
The article examined Kuhn’s influences and context including the idea of science in the early ’60s:
… when a young Kuhn was teaching the history of science at Harvard. Kuhn’s tenure at Harvard coincided with the waning years of the presidency of James B. Conant, a chemist who had long left the lab in favor of scientific and political administration. …
… Conant sought a pedagogical strategy that could cultivate a new generation of curious scientists and instill respect for science among nonscientists but that would also carefully calibrate citizens’ questioning of authority.
Conant’s solution was historical method. Shortly after the war ended, Conant began teaching a new course on the history and philosophy of science for Harvard undergraduates. In a turn that was unusual for courses in the history of science at the time, Conant covered scientific wrong turns and dead ends, including alchemy and theories of spontaneous generation. Kuhn’s experience of teaching a version of this course transformed his understanding of the history and philosophy of science.
This crucial context explains the book’s otherwise peculiar obsession with scientific textbooks. The problem with textbooks, as Kuhn repeatedly explains, echoing Conant, is that they obscure scientific debate and prior explanations in the name of inducting students into the reigning understanding of how the world works—that is, a scientific paradigm. These textbooks, he claims, have to be “rewritten” when normal science changes, because they “refer only to that part of the work of past scientists that can easily be viewed as contributions to the statement and solution of the texts’ paradigm problems.”
….
Kuhn claimed, both in 1962 and for the rest of his career, that he had not intended any of this as an attack on the scientific enterprise itself. For Kuhn, the entire point of Structure was to elucidate what he and many scientists of his generation saw as science’s distinctive ability to build cumulative knowledge.
….
… Kuhn himself acknowledged one critical way in which his account of scientific progress diverged from common understanding: It had nothing to do with truth. Instead of thinking of science as a process that inevitably draws closer to natural reality, Kuhn suggested that we treat scientific change as an evolutionary process … in which various paradigms compete for community advantage.
Ibid
The article also examined whether Kuhn had contributed to the popularity of European philosophical trends, such as structuralism, critical theory and Foucalt’s theories of power, authority and knowledge among academics and the general public:
By the mid-1980s, a new generation of historians, sociologists, and anthropologists of science brought a more critical lens to scientific power. They incorporated ideas about race, sex, gender, national and historical context, and, most importantly, power into their analyses of what drove scientific communities to embrace some theories and reject others. Defenders of science took to calling this approach “Kuhnian,” to Kuhn’s everlasting chagrin. The charge was ridiculous then and ridiculous now: Structure’s approach to its topic is in …intellectually conservative, given that it excludes the natural and social sciences and any discussion of technology or … “external social, economic, and intellectual conditions in the development of the sciences.”
Ibid
Another article “The Realist and the Pragmatist” in the online edition of the magazine Aeon (not paywalled at the time), discussing paradigms in epistemology. She discussed Kuhn in the context of theories articulated in logical empiricist school of philosophy by Rudolph Carnap. She contrasts framed enquiries and framing enquiries. She suggests the latter lead to what Kuhn called ‘paradigm shifts’ and notes that:
… in framed enquiry, the framework constrains the space of possible answers, while in framing enquiry, the issue is more open-ended. We do not aim at a predetermined target in the same way that a murder investigation aims at finding out who the murderer is. When we discuss our conceptions of democracy, gender, efficiency, the goal is to build conceptual structures that help us make sense of the world, given our purposes. There is no right answer to be found ‘out there’
….
This is not to say that, when we engage in framing enquiry, we should give up on any ideal of objectivity. The open-endedness of framing enquiry does not amount to a free-for-all pass to choose or create the framework that fits one’s prior beliefs and desires. In fact, doing so would be the opposite of open-endedness, since it would subordinate the entire enquiry to predetermined ends. Instead, facts matter in framing enquiry because there is a constant iterative adjustment between frameworks and facts. … . Reasons, arguments and evidence still have a central role to play in framing enquiry.
This is why it is important to know when we are engaged in a framed or a framing enquiry. Unfortunately, it is not always straightforward to tell, especially from the inside. First, the distinction between framed and framing enquiry is a spectrum rather than a dichotomy, and that complicates matters. Many of our daily investigations are very clearly on the framed end of the spectrum: why is the kitchen sink leaking? How many eggs do we have in the fridge? But in more complex enquiries, whether in science or politics, the boundaries between framed and framing enquiry are blurred, as we most often alternate between the two.
Celine Hénne, “The Realist and the Pragmatist”. Aeone